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1. Introduction: Shifting Boundaries in Financial Markets Governance 
Since the 1970s, financial market integration has progressed through an 
increasing amount of cross-border and cross-exchange trade. Advances in financial 
technology made various risks tradable, and risks and costs associated with certain 
transactions and financial institutions spread beyond national borders. Accordingly, 
enhanced collective action has become necessary to ensure financial market stability. 
The European Union's (EU) scope for collective action has been even larger due to its 
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single market policy. Regional and international organizations started to play a -greater 
role in encouraging cross-national cooperation in financial supervision. 
At the same time, financial market integration and advances m fmancial 
teclmology led to increasing reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions. Such 
self-regulation included an internal risk-based (IRB) approach that was adopted through 
Base! II and Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Financial institutions were 
obligated to develop an adequate risk management system, and those that developed an 
advanced risk management capacity (typically, internationally active financial 
conglomerates) were allowed to take into account their risk assessments in calculating 
risk-weighted assets and regulatory capitaL 
The 2007 financial crisis revealed the limitations of the existing financial 
regulatory framework. Such limitations include: I) over-reliance on self-regulation of 
financial institutions, 2) uncoordinated financial supervisory practices across the 
countries, and 3) ad-hoc international cooperation in financial crisis management 
First, to ensure financial stability, risk management practices need to be 
improved by financial institutions as well as regulators. In order to encourage disclosure 
of financial transactions and Impose tighter capital requirements on financial 
investments in complicated financial products, monitoring functions by regulators over 
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self-regulation must be strengthened. For example, risk correlation between asset 
holdings of different institotions and the contagious effects of the crush of certain 
financial products markets needs to be taken into account m calculating risk and 
regulatory capital. Strong political initiatives at national, regional, and international. 
leveis hel.p enforce tighter reguiations in consideration of the impacts of individual. 
financial institotions' investments on macro-financial. market stabiiity. 
Second, closer international cooperation in financial supervision can help tackle 
financial. market vulnerability and volatility that spread across the countries through 
international banking and investments. In order to assess the risk of an entire fmancial 
group that has many foreign branches/subsidiaries, cross-national supervisory 
cooperation is necessary. In addition, financial supervisory cooperation and regulatory 
harmonization promote a level playing field to prevent regulatory arbitrage from 
occurring. 
Third, cross-national cooperation m crisis management 1s necessary to get 
damaged financial markets back on the path toward recovery. Moreover, closer cross-
national cooperation m financial crisis management can facilitate cross-national 
supervisory cooperation. When the costs of failures of financial institotions fall only 
onto host countries, home countries could lose an incentive to tightly supervise their 
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foreign branches. In a modified crisis management framework, failure costs need to be 
linked with supervisory responsibility. 
To overcome the regulatory pitfalls, regulatory capacity and resources in 
financial markets governance need to be enhanced, not only at national but also at 
global levels. In order to shed light on policy tssues and agendas in international 
financial policy cooperation, this paper focuses on the ·case of European fmancial 
integration and regulations. The analysis of policy developments at the European level 
in coordinating differing national interests, supervisory systems, and practices among 
EU member states highlights fundamental elements of global financial regulatory 
cooperation. 
2. Cross-National Cooperation in Financial Supervision in Europe 
The first part of the section overviews the impacts of a European framework on 
national financial supervision, in reference to a German case. Since the late 1980s, the 
EU has prompted member states to adopt tighter financial supervisory policies and 
strengthen resources and capacities of central financial supervisory agencies. The latter 
part of the section exammes recent legal and policy developments before and after 
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financial crisis, including a post-crisis proposal called the de Larosiere Report. It 
became apparent that the existing European cooperation framework needed to be 
reformed when it was unable to prevent or effectively mitigate the 2007 global financial 
crisis. 
2-1. Euro-Passport Policy and Minimum Regulatory Harmonization 
Europe has facilitated its single market policy in financial services through the 
following measures: 1) lowering regulatory barriers for global business expansions of 
financial institutions through adopting a Euro-Passport policy, 2) introducing a home 
country principle and mutual recognition, and 3) enhancing regulatory and enforcement 
capacities of national financial supervisors to meet minimum requirements and ensure a 
level playing field. These policies enabled member countries to tighten and centralize 
the financial market supervisory functions. 
Euro-Passport Policy and a Home Country Principle 
In December 1991, the European Council agreed on the Maastricht Treaty that 
mandated a path toward the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). As a first 
step, the European Monetary Institute (EMl) was established to promote cooperation 
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among central banks. It was replaced by the European Central Bank (ECB), which had a 
mandate to lay out a single monetary policy and maintain a single currency. The ECB 
and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) that were composed of the ECB and 
the national central banks (NCBs) of all 27 EU Member States were established in 
accordance with Maastricht Treaty Article 4a (ESCB Statue Article I ).1 
According to Article 2 of the ESCB Statue, "the primary objective of the ESCB 
shall be to maintain price stability." Article 2 further states that "without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the 
Community." Basic tasks of the ESCB are itemized under Article 3.1: I) implementing 
monetary policies, 2) conducting foreign exchange operations, 3) managing official 
foreign reserves, and 4) promoting the smooth operation of payment systems. 
According to the ESCB Statute, neither financial supervisory authority nor the role of 
lender of last resort (LOLR) is explicitly assigned to the ECB, although there is still 
room for interpretation to give an increasing role for the ECB, as will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
Through the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive in 1992, Europe adopted a 
"Euro-Passport" model in financial supervision. This means that financial institutions 
I. See Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 191/68,29. July 1992 
http://www .ecb. int/ec b/lega 1/pdf/en _protocol_IS. pdf 
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can conduct their businesses m other European countries (host countries) through 
establishing branches or subsidiaries, based on the license given by their home countries. 
They can offer the same financial services as they do in their home countries. The same 
principle was applied to investment fmns and investment funds through the Investment 
Services Directive (ISD) of 1993 that was replaced by the Markets m Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFIDs) of 2007, and the Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS). 
The principle of Euro-Passport is based on mutual recognition of home country 
rules. This concept is distinguished from international harmonization. Whereas 
international harmonization aims at establishing uniformity of rules across countries, 
mutual recognition aims at preserving each country's national laws to a certain extent, 
which reflect their respective market needs and various stages of development. 2 
According to this concept m the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, credit 
institutions' branches that are located in other member states are subject to supervision 
by home supervisors. 
However, in order to apply mutual recognition, minimal regulatory requirements 
need to be met. For example, the Own Funds Directive of 1989 laid out a common 
2. Kubot8, Takashi, (2008). "International Harmonization and Mutual Recognition in the Global 
Financial Regulation," In Waseda Hogaku, 83-3, pp 6-10. 
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concept of "own funds," harmonized supervisory techniques, and set minimum solvency 
ratios. Similarly, the ISD laid out a concept of the "regulated market" where securities 
transactions occur and service providers are subject to detailed disclosure requirements. 
These EU Directives prompted member countries to strengthen supervisory resources 
and enhance market disclosure. 
The Impacts on National Financial Supervisory Systems 
Long before European integration proceeded, each nation developed its own 
legal structure in financial supervision. For example, in Germany, in response to the 
world economic crisis in 1931, the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz: KWG) 
came into force on January I, 1935 and gave a legal basis for national financial 
supervision. In 1962, the KWG was fundamentally revised, and financial supervisory 
functions were centralized from the state to the national level. The Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen: BAKred) gained the 
main supervisory authority in cooperation with the Deutsche Bundeshank. 
As European integration deepened, each nation was obligated to transpose 
European Directives into national Jaws. In Germany, financial supervision was 
tightened through the creation of a new federal supervisor and implementation of EU 
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Directives. The impacts of EU Directives on the German financial supervisory system 
were especially prominent in securities market regulations. 
In Germany, supervisory authority over securities was held by states (Liinder). 
The self-regulatory features resulted m fewer regulations. Underdeveloped capital 
markets led to a smaller pool of investment, thus raising funding costs and driving 
German companies out of domestic markets. To tighten securities regulations and 
coordinate fragmented securities supervisory authorities, the second Financial Market 
Promotion Act established the federal securities supervisory office (Das 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir den Wertpapierhandel: BaWe) that started its operation in !995. 
The same Jaw banned insider trading, extended disclosure requirements, and instituted 
other investor protection measures by implementing European directives such as the 
Insider Directive, the Transparency Directive, and the ISD.3 
Parallel to cross-national integration of financial services in Europe through 
Euro-Passport Policy, cross-sectoral integration across banking, securities, and 
insurance has proceeded, which JS typically represented by the emergence of 
"bankassurance." In response to cross-sectoral integration, the federal financial 
3. Baum, Harald, (2005). "Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience," 
In Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US, 
Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda, and Harald Baum (Eds.) 20-21. 
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supervisory office (Die Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht: BaFin) was 
created in Germany based on the Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision 
(Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz: FinDAG), and started its operation m 2002. 
BaFin integrated the supervisory functions over all fmancial services. It was created 
under a policy aimed at achieving more effective supervision of financial conglomerates 
and enhancing German presence in regional and international fmancial policy meetings 
through a single representative entity. 
Summary 
Thus, as illustrated by a German case, the European framework has enhanced 
the effectiveness of financial supervision as well as promoted a single-market policy. A 
policy of mutual recognition led not only to lowering barriers to the activities of pan-
_European financial institutions but also to imposing mandatory minimum regulatory 
requirements on those activities. Development of a European framework fundamentally 
affected the national financial supervisory structure. 
A single market policy has facilitated financial market integration in Europe 
parallel to global financial integration, thus leading to the growth of pan-European and 
global financial conglomerates. Accordingly, systemic risk has been amplified and 
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spread beyond national borders. To assess risk and ensure overall financial stability 
under such situations, consistent supervisory standards and 'Practices among countries 
have become increasingly important. Closer cross-national coordination is needed in 
standard-setting, law-making, and enforcement stages. 
2-2. Financial Supervisory Cooperation at an Enforcement Stage: Some Issues 
A major initiative toward -financial supervisory integration started even before 
the 2007 financial crisis. Recommendations by the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of the European Securities Markets (Chairman Alexandre Lamfalussy) led to 
creation of the Level 3 committees that played certain roles in financial supervisory 
convergence. International agreements such as the Base! Accords as well as the CRD 
provided common supervisory standards across nations, thus facilitating a path to 
regulatory harmonization. 
The Level 3 Committees 
To enhance cooperation m financial superviSion and enforcement, the EU 
established regional supervisory agencies that strengthened policy coordination among 
12 
national financial supervisory authorities. Such institutions are the Level 3 committees: 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisor (CEBS), the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR). The Level 3 comririttees support legislative 
initiatives in financial regulations, enhance legal enforcement, and promote cross-
national supervisory information exchanges. These committees were instituted under a 
four-level cooperative fmancial governance scheme (legislative, regulatory, supervisory 
convergence, and enforcement), called the Lamfalussy framework. 
The Level 3 committees played a role in laying out standard rules and practices 
in accordance with minimum regulatory standards agreed upon at European and global 
levels. Examples include their roles in implementing the CRD by way of issuing 
guidelines, as will be discussed below. The CRD was introduced in October 2005 to 
implement Base! !I in Europe as agreed upon by the global community. Europe 
implemented the Base! Accords with extended application of rules to nonbank financial 
servtces. 
Base/11 and the CRD 
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Base! II was approved in 2004 after four consultation stages and laid out three 
pillars: 1) minimum capital requirement (Pillar I), 2) supervisory review process (Pillar 
II), and 3) market discipline (Pillar III). In Pillar I, risk-sensitive measures were 
introduced, and some weights were given to internal risk assessment. 4 Financial 
institutions that developed an advanced risk management capacity were allowed to use 
their own internal risk-based assessments (IRB approach). The adoption of IRB led to 
an expanded role of self-regulation in financial supervision. The definition of risk was 
expanded, to include credit risk, market risk, and operational risk-' 
Pillar II of Base! II is composed of two elements: I) the International Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and 2) Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP). ICAAP guides banks to organize an internal risk and capital 
management system. In addition, according to Pillar 11 of Base! 11, individual banks' 
internal risk management process needs to be subject to scrutiny by financial 
4. A risk-sensitive approach caused a problem of pro-cyclicality. Financial institutions were obliged to 
hold less capital in an economic uptul)l and more capital in an economic downturn. As a result, capital 
requirements did not help calm the financial bubble or restore economic growth during economic 
recession. Although this paper does not address this issue, a solution to the problem ofpro-cyclicality is 
one of the major policy agendas that would ensure financial stability. 
5. In Base! I, neither market risk nor operational risk was taken into account. Market risk was 
incorporated for the first time in the "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks" that 
was published in January 1996 and amended Base! I. Market risk includes interest rate risk, currency risk, 
and counterparty risk, whereas operational risk means human errors in logistics and illegal activities. 
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supervisors. Thus, SREP provides the guidelines on how fmancial supervisors evaluate 
a bank's internal risk management system. 
CEBS's Guidelines 
In accordance with Base! 11 and the CRD, the CEBS developed an integrated 
guideline on the supervisory review process (SRP) of European banks and investment 
firms in January 2006 after two rounds of public consultation. 6 In combination with two 
other CEBS guidelines on cooperation between consolidating and host supervisors and 
on stress testing, 7 the guideline for SRP provides a basic framework of financial 
supervisory practices and cross-national cooperation in Europe. To capture the overall 
risk profile of and 1mpose adequate capital requirements on pan-European financial 
institutions, cooperation between consolidating and host supervisors has increasingly 
become critical. 
6. CEBS. (2006), "Guidelines on t~e Application of the Supervisory Review Process under Pillar 2" 
published on 25 January 2006, available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/00ec6db3-bb41-467c-acb9-
8e271 f617675/GL03.aspx. 
7. CESS. (2006), "Guidelines for Co--operation between Consolidating Supervisors and Host 
Supervisors" published on 25 January 2006, available at: http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/cb2b33ce-c043-
444e-90b2-l e61 a5354173/GL09.aspx. CEBS, "Technical Aspects of Stress Testing under the 
Supervisory Review Process" published on 14 December 2006, available at: http://www.c-
ebs.org/ getdoc/e68d361 e-eb02-4e28-baf8-0e77 efe5 728e/G L03stresstesting.aspx. 
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Financial institutions need to adjust their risk assessment and capital 
requirements according to the suggestions from supervisors. Importantly, the guideline 
on SRP mandates that supervisors take into account not only quantitative but also 
qualitative risk In addition, the guideline on stress testing requrres that fmancial 
supervisors conduct stress tests as part of assessment process, the results of which need 
to be incorporated into the calculation of capital. The stress test measures the extent to 
which financial institutions can withstand macroeconomic or financial market shocks. 
Moreover, the guideline on cooperation between consolidating (home) and host 
supervisors addresses the lack of supervisory information of an entire fmancial group 
due to cross-national activities of each fmancial institution and segmentation of 
financial supervisory authorities. This guideline mandates that consolidating and host 
supervisors work in close cooperation while identifying and monitoring financial 
institutions' branches/subsidiaries of systemic relevance for a whole group. An 
exchange of supervisory information on these institutions' foreign offices is necessary to 
assess risk and capital requirements of an entire group. 
Financial Supervisory Cooperation 
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A home country principle has capacity limitations and incentive problems 
regarding superviSIOn of cross-national fmancial conglomerates. Based on a home 
country principle, foreign subsidiaries are supervised by host supervisors, whereas 
foreign branches are supervised by consolidating (home) supervisors. Host supervisors 
do not have primary responsibility over the financial health of branches of foreign banks, 
which are located within their national borders. Problematically, consolidating 
supervisors do not often have access to detailed supervisory information about the 
foreign branches of their financial institutions. 
In addition, consolidating supervisors might not have an incentive to tightly 
supervise them, smce resolution costs often fall onto a host country m case of 
insolvency. This could lead to moral hazard, as seen in an Icelandic case. In this case, 
the expansion of branches continued without a sufficient amount of deposit guarantee 
funds and adequate financial supervision. This resulted in accumulated costs ex post 
imposed on the host countries8 
An institutional framework to strengthen cooperation in financial supervision in 
Europe came to the fore in a reform proposal that was launched in response to the 2007 
8. The de LarosiCre Group, "The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU" Chaired by 
Jacques de Larosiere Report 25 February 2009, p35; Afso see House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
(2009). "Banking Crisis: The impact of the failure of the Jcelandic banks" on 31 March 2009, Available 
from http://www. publications. parliament. uk!pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/402/402. pdf 
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global financial crisis. Closer cooperation can enhance fmancial stability in Europe 
tbrough understanding accurate risk features of pan-European fmancial institutions. 
3-3. Reform Proposals in Response to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis 
After Europe was hit by the 2007 global fmancial cns1s, the European 
/ 
Parliament approved the amendments of the CRD on May 6, 2009. This amendment 
aimed at enforcing stricter financial supervision over a cross-national banking group 
and improving quality of capital adequacy and risk management over securitized 
products. 
In response to suggestions from the European Parliament, the EU Commission is 
required to submit detailed proposals by the end of 2009 based on the following points: 
I) minimum 5% equity holding against financial institutions' investment in securitized 
products, 2) tightened regulations over the most frequently used derivatives instruments 
such as Credit Default Swap (CDS) and over-the-counter {OTC) market products, 3) 
establishment of the central clearing house to reduce the risk of derivatives instruments, 
and 4) cross-country integration of financial supervision over pan-European financial 
institutions9 As discussed above, the last point, integration of financial supervision, can 
9. Redaktion beck-aktuell, Verlag C. H. Beck, May 8, 2009, "EU verscharft Eigenkapitalvorschriften 
fUr Bank en." 
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play a large role in enhancing fmancial market stability and mitigating negative effects 
of financial crises. 
Detailed policy measures to enhance supervisory integration under the lead of 
European institutions were contained in the de Larosiere Report that proposed a new 
financial supervisory architecture in Europe on February 25, 2009. This proposal was 
written by an expert group that was formed in October 2008 under former International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) president Jacques de Larosiere. 
The de Larosiere Report: Assessment 
According to the de Larosiere Report, a new European institution, called the 
European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), needs to be instituted and presided over by 
the ECB. Such an institution would replace the existing Banking Supervision 
Committee (BSC) within the ECB and would be assigned a new legal mandate of 
macro-supervision and early warnmg. Macro-supervision concerns overall financial 
market stability and economy as opposed to micro-supervision that concerns solvency 
of individual financial institutions. This proposal also suggests fuller regulatory 
harmonization of a European financial market. 10 
10. The de Larosit:re Group, "The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU" Chaired by 
Jacques de Larosiere Report 25 February 2009, pp. 38-39, Also see Neue Zeitschrift fUr 
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The proposal mandates that national financial supervisory authorities maintain 
their monitoring power in their jurisdictions m cooperation with reformed Level 3 
committees. These committees renamed the European Banking Authority, the European 
Insurance Authority, and the European Securities Authority, will be assigned 
enforcement power and increased regulatory competence. These three new authorities 
would replace the existing CEBS, CEIOPS, and CESR, respectively, and have 
representation at the ESRC that decides on macro-prudential policies and provides early 
• 11 
warnmg. 
Establishing the ESRC can improve the risk assessment process as well as cross-
national cooperation m financial superviSion. One of the lessons learned from the 
current financial crisis is that the overall risk can be much larger than an aggregated 
amount of risk stemming from all individual financial institutions. As the de Larosiere 
Report points out, "regulators and supervisors focused on the micro-prudential 
supervision of individual financial institutions and not sufficiently on the macro-
systemic risks of a contagion of correlated horizontal shocks." 12 Financial supervision is 
Gesellschaftsrecht 2009 Heft 9, 337, Fischer zu Cramburg "Finanzmarktaufsicht l: Bericht der :-~lde 
Larosiere-Gruppe.·· 
11. The de Larosiere Group 2009, p57. 
12. The de Larosiere GrOup 2009, pl J. 
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essential not only from a "micro-prudential" point· of view to reduce the risk of 
individual banks' failures to an acceptable level, but also from "macro-prudential" and 
"macroeconomic perspectives" to ensure the overall financial market stability. 13 
Moreover, the ESRC could facilitate cross-national cooperation in fmancial 
supervision. To understand the overall systemic risk across countries and maintain the 
financial market stability, supervisory infom1ation needs to be shared cross-nationally. 
The proposed European framework ensures that supervisory information will be 
transmitted from national supervisors to the ESRC. In consideration of the impacts 
upon the overall European financial stability, the ESRC can mandate corrective actions 
to national supervisors. 
Such new pan-European institutional arrangements could also benefit non-
European countries, since this could make a European financial system more transparent 
and facilitate supervisory informational exchange, not only within Europe but also 
between European and non-European countries. The de Larosiere Report recommends 
that when changes of global rules become necessary, Europe should "speak with one 
13. The de Larosiere Group 2009, p 17. 
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voice," whereas harmonization of minimum core standards needs to be achieved at a 
European level with consistent national transposition of directives. 14 
Summary 
The 2007 global financial crisis revealed that existing European financial 
supemsory schemes were ineffective for preventing or mitigating financial crises. 
Existing schemes of financial supervisory cooperation did not help gauge the risk 
features of financial conglomerates. To overcome lack of supervision, a new policy 
· proposal gave the. European authorities, including the ESRC, enforcement power to 
coordinate and intervene in national supervisory policies based on a macro-prudential 
perspective. 
When the ESRC is instituted m Europe, it could lead to more effective 
intervention on the part of financial supervisors with respect to risk exposures and 
capital holdings of pan-European financial conglomerates. The 2007 global financial 
crisis underscored the necessity of enhancing financial supervisory offices' enforcement 
capabilities. Financial supervisory offices should be able to grasp the overall risk 
features of financial institutions with systemic relevance and exercise cross-nationally 
14. The de Larosiere Group 2009, p 29. 
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coordinated supervisory actions m accordance with ever-changing economic and 
financial situations. In addition, such institutional reforms need to be combined with 
improved regulation of investment funds and transparency of f"mancial products and 
transactions. Moreover, pro-cyclicality Issues resulting from risk-sensitive capital 
requirements need to be addressed. 
3. Cooperation in Financial Crisis Management in Europe 
Parallel to cooperation in financial supervision, cooperation in f"mancial crisis 
management is necessary to get the damaged financial markets back on a path toward 
recovery. This section discusses the lack of a regional cooperation framework for 
financial cns1s management in Europe. This Issue drew a high degree of attention 
through the 2007 global financial cns1s. Coordinated and smooth investigation of 
troubled financial institutions and fiscal responses are often necessary in a case of the 
disposal of troubled pan-European financial institutions. The first part of this section 
contrasts the global nature of the 2007 financial crisis with the national crisis responses, 
illustrated by the case of Germany. Germany was one of the countries that were most 
23 
severely hit by the 2007 financial crisis. The latter part of this section examines issues 
and recent agendas involving financial crisis management in Europe. 
3-1. Global Financial Losses and National Crisis Responses 
Financial losses due to the 2007 financial crisis spread around the world. Europe 
was not an exception and it was one of the regions hit most severely by the crisis. Large 
I 
financial losses resulted from subprime loans and subprime-related investments. 
Financial losses also resulted from securitized products, other structured products, non-
subprime mortgage and corporate loans, and market illiquidity m a cns1s period. 
Securitized products expenencmg losses included collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS), and Jeveraged loans. In addition, losses spread through banks as 
well as insurance companies, investment funds, and govenunent-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs). 
Hit by the 2007 global financial crisis, total estimates of potential banks' losses 
stemming from securitized products (including both subprime and non-subprime ones) 
amounted to $470-530 billion in October 2008 at a global level. When other financial 
sectors' estimated losses, such as those in insurance, pensions, GSEs, and hedge funds, 
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are included, the total estimated losses stemming from securitized products are $980 
billion out of the exposure of $10.840 trillion to those products.15 At a European level, 
net European banks' exposures to U.S. subprime mortgage markets are reported as $279 
billion as of March 2008. Estimated losses on these subprime-related products are 
reported as $123 billion, including reported losses of $80 billion.16 The majority portion 
of losses due to the 2007 fmancial crisis comes from banking sector and subprime-
related products. 
Financial and fiscal responses to the financial crisis have been made mainly on a 
country-by-country basis, although national central banks and the ECB exercised 
coordinated quantitative easmg m order to increase financial market liquidity and 
stimulate the economy. Europe has not developed a detailed agreement on cns1s 
management schemes and measures. Only ad-hoc cross-border solutions and informal 
guidance through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) exist. In addition, a potential 
candidate for that role, the ECB, does not have a clear legal mandate to function as 
LOLR, as discussed in the next section. 
15. International Monetary Fund, "Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and 
Deleveraging, Macrofinanciallmplications and Policy" World Economic and Financial Surveys, October 
2008, p. 15. 
16. IMF "Regional Economic Outlook: Europe Reassessing Risks," World Economic and Financial 
Surveys April 2008, p25, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2008/eur/eng/ereo0408.pdf, p. 25 
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In Germany, in response to the 2007 financial global crisis, its govennnent 
announced the enactment of measures to stabilize financial markets and regulatory 
reforms on October 13, 2008. This plan proposed the use of about €470 billion for 
recapitalization by the end of 2009, with €400 billion for credit guarantee, and €70 
billion for direct capital injection. At the same time, the govennnent promised balanced 
budget by 2011. Financial market stabilization funds will be established to strengthen 
capital adequacy of troubled banks and purchase risk assets including derivatives. 17 
Accordingly, Financial Market Stability Law (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesets: 
FMStG) was approved by Bundestag and Bundesrat on October 17, 2008. This law 
allowed public funds to be used for the following three purposes in order to stabilize 
financial markets:. I) to guarantee risk when financial institutions give new credits to 
businesses, 2) to recapitalize the troubled financial institutions that are relevant to the 
federal state, and 3) to acquire bad assets from troubled financial institutions. 18 The 
troubled financial institutions received guarantee from this fund as follows: €30 billion 
for the HSH Nordbank, €1 5 billion for the Bayerische Landesbank, €30 billion for the 
17. beck-aktuell Redaktion, Verlag CH. Beck, October 13,2008, "Europ3ische Strategie zur 
Stabilisierung der Finanzmiirkt.e beschlossen - Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung fUr deutsches 
MaBnahmen - Paket steht." 
18. Zeitschrift fUr Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2008, Heft 11, 452, Norbert Horn, "Das 
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz und das Risikomanagement zur globalen Finanzkrise." 
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Hypo Real Estate (HRE), €15 billion for the Commerzbank, and €5 billion for the IKB 
Deutsche.19 
Fiscal responses were made nationally, and the timing and measures varied 
across countries. The domestic nature of crisis responses contrasted with the global and 
regional nature of the 2007 fmancial crisis. Most of the financial institutions that were 
severely hit by the financial crisis were internationally active ones with foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. In addition, European banks' major losses came from the bursting of 
the U.S. asset bubbles and subprime-related investments. 
There are a series of discussions on domestic remedial actions and reforms. For 
example, in Germany, mergers or reforms of Landesbank became a maJOr reform 
agenda. Landesbank were given an excessive credit supply based on its government 
guarantee and made an enormous investment in complicated financial products. In 
addition, German financial supervisory authorities lacked regulatory tools and access to 
information for monitoring accurate risk profiles of foreign branches/subsidiaries of 
19. beck-aktuell Redaktion, Verlag C. H., Beck, Febrary 6, 2009, "BaFin priift Banken seit Beginn der 
Finanzkrise scharfer." Until June 2009, IKB received public money of a total of€9.2 billion to cover 
losses from their investment in toxic U.S. assets (See Newsweek, June 22, 2009, International Edition, 
"The Germans are toxic too: claims of safer banks now ring false"). 
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German banks whose management was highly exposed to a maturity mismatch problem, 
.as seen in a case of HRE. 
However, given the regional or global nature of financial crises and fmancial 
institutions, some tasks of crisis management need to be handled regionally or globally. 
As seen in a case of the resolution of Fortis, a major pan-European financial institution, 
ex-post negotiation of a share of burden takes longer. The resolution costs tend to 
become higher when the states wait for their fiscal remedies. As an initial- step in the 
design of a cooperative framework, Issues and agendas relevant to European 
cooperation in fmancial crisis management are described in the next section. 
3-2. A Potential Role of the European Authority in Financial Crisis Management 
The lack of coordinated financial crisis management schemes at a European 
level fundamentally stems from nonexistence of a pan-European treasury ·department or 
equivalent. This leads to inevitable difficulty in cooperating in crisis management that 
often involves the use of a large pool of funds, including taxpayers' money. A basic 
principle that was adopted in the Maastricht Treaty was separation between fiscal and 
monetary authorities, ass1gnmg the former to a national level and the latter to a 
European leveL Modifications to this principle could be politically difficult. 
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Lack of coordinated cns1s management at the European level led to slow 
responses to the resolution of pan-European banks in the 2007 fmancial cns1s. To 
overcome such negative policy consequences, several institutional alternatives need to 
be considered. Alternative options include a potential role of the ECB as LOLR and the 
creation of a privately funded deposit insurance scheme. 
Given that the ESCB has responsibility for the smooth operation of payment 
systems, the ECB can provide liquidity in the case of the payment system lock-up. 
However, the ECB does not have a clear mandate for liquidity provision to specific 
troubled banks that are illiquid but solvent. Article 2 of the ESCB Statute allows the 
ECB to support general economic policies as long as it does not contradict with price 
stability. Since liquidity provision will lead to inflation, an expanded ECB role in a case 
of financial crisis based on Article 2 could be problematic. 20 
Instead, Article 3.3 of the ESCB Statute describing ESCB's supplementary role 
in financial supervision provides possible justification for an expanded ECB role as 
LOLR. Article 3.3 states that "the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of 
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and the stability of the financial system." ESCB's contribution to 
20. Steven R. Blau, (2008) "The Federal Reserve and European Central Bank as Lenders of Last-
Resort: different needles in their compasses," New York International Law Review 39. 
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national supervisory policies is defined only as supplementary tasks under Article 3.3 
that are assigned separately from the basic tasks .defmed under Article 3.1. Tiris could 
potentially justifY the ECBs' role as LOLR as long as it is compatible with fmancial 
supervisory policies conducted by national supervisors. 21 Thus, a well-coordinated 
national fmancial supervisory policy at a European level, as was discussed m the 
prevwus section, could facilitate an increasing role of the ECB m fmancial crisis 
management. 
In addition, the de Larosiere Report suggests that Europe develop deposit 
guarantee schemes (DGS) that are harmonized and pre-funded by the private sector.22 
The public EU fund for crisis management was not supported due to political reasons. 
"The idea of a pooled EU fund, composed of the national deposit guarantee funds, has 
been discussed by the Group, but has not been supported. The setting-up and 
management of such a fund would raise n~erous political and practical problems."23 
When crisis management schemes are set up, they need to avoid moral hazards 
that can result from the existence of public guarantees. For example, in the case of 
21. Steven R. Blau, 2008, pp. 19-20. 
22. The de Larosii:re Group 2009, p 36. 
23. The de Larosiere Group 2009, p 35. 
30 
failures of some Landesbank in Germany, the oversupply of credit gained through 
goverrunent guarantees led to exceSSIVe investments m structured products with 
unknown risk and unfamiliar fmancial techniques. 
In order to achieve prompt and effective crisis management without ex-post 
negotiation and to avoid moral hazards at the same time, a clear resolution scheme for 
troubled financial institutions needs to be achieved on a general level, not on an 
individual financial institution level. The de Larosiere Report emphasizes that, although 
"a clear and consistent framework for crisis management is required with full 
transparency and certainty," "constructive ambiguity and uncertainty is appropriate in 
the application of these arrangements in future individual cases of distressed banks."24 
3-3. Summary 
Regional cooperation in financial crisis management could be more politically 
difficult than supervisory integration, due to its direct link to the use of taxpayers' 
money. To promptly relieve the European economy from the turmoil of fmancial crises, 
detailed schemes for disposing of troubled pan-European financial conglomerates and 
dealing with ongoing financial crises need to be developed at the European level. Strict 
24. The ?e Larosiere Group 2009, p 33. 
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application of a principle of separation between fiscal and monetary authorities and 
delegation of only the latter at the European level would limit cross-national 
cooperation for smooth disposal of troubled financial institutions. 
Several policy options were discussed to strengthen cooperative function m 
financial cns1s management. Progress m fmancial supervisory cooperation could 
facilitate cooperation in financial crisis management in Europe through an enhanced 
role of the ECB. In addition, a pool of funding for a deposit insurance scheme and a 
cross-national burden sharing rule could provide alternative measures. A rule for burden 
sharing needs to be detemlined and agreed ex-ante m order to mitigate ex-post 
collective action problems that anse when cnses become a reality and lead to 
subsequent financiallosses 25 
4. Conclusion: An Analysis from a Political Economy Perspective 
The 2007 financial crisis triggered a shift in the b01,mdaries between states and 
markets as well as between states and regional/global authorities. Public skepticism 
arose against ever-expanding freedom of financial conglomerates with world-wide 
25. This point owes to the discussions at the Center for Financial Studies (CFS) Research Conference, 
"A New Supervisory Architecture for Europe's Banking System" on June 5, 2009, in Frankfurt. 
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branches/subsidiaries to innovate, arrange, and sell complicated financial products, 
including structured and securitized ones. Post-crisis momentum has become in favor of 
pre-emptive actions by regulators and states based on their assessments of the risk 
features of such institutions and transactions. 
Financial institutions of systemic relevance warrant tightened fmancial 
supervision due to the impact of their fmanciallosses and bankruptcies. As most of such 
large financial institutions adopt an internal risk model to calculate risk and regulatory 
capital, according to the current Base] Il and CRD frameworks, institutional resources 
and capacities of financial supervisors need to further develop in order to monitor and 
mandate remedial actions against flaws in the internal risk models through SRP. The 
cooperative functions between consolidating and host supervisors need to be 
strengthened along with enhanced supervisory authorities at the European level. 
Whereas the 2007 financial crisis revealed the limitations of self-regulation, it 
also underscored government failures, including moral hazard issues that stemmed from 
state guarantees and deposit insurance. Examples include excess liquidity held by 
Landesbank in Germany. Although government failures did not draw as much attention 
as did market failures in the context of the 2007 financial crisis, both are important 
aspects in designing market governance. 
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Thus, the 2007 financial crisis seems to have had nrixed effects on the direction 
of power shifts between states and markets, A new fmancial governance design needs to 
give sufficient resources and authorities to the states that enable them to enforce 
necessary regulatory actions as well as prevent the states from providing arbitrary 
privileges to certain financial institutions and providing too much liquidity to the 
markets. 
The same financial crisis led to discussions on the rearrangement of political 
resources and regulatory capacities that were allocated across multi-level governance to 
achieve more effective financial supervision. Due to a global feature of financial· 
transactions, markets, and institutions, strengthening regulatory capacities at a supra-
national level has become a more important policy goal. In a European context, concrete 
institutional reform proposals were put into an agenda to enhance regulatory power of 
European institutions. 
Such institutions at the European level should promote coordinated enforcement 
of corrective measures, based on their monitoring of the distribution of systemic risk. 
Closer coordination m financial supervisiOn can facilitate further cooperation m 
financial cns1s management. However, safety-net measures to mitigate the negative 
shocks of the financial crisis should not lead to depriving financial institutions of their 
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own incentives for self-restraint and self-regulation. Again, a question of balancing 
power between states and markets needs to be addressed in tbe process of setting up a 
new fmancial architecture at tbe supra-national leveL 
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List of Acronyms 
BaFin: The federal financial supervisory office (Die Bundesanstalt fur 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) 
BAK.red: The Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das 
Kreditwesen) 
BaWe: The federal securities supervisory office (Das Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den 
Wertpapierhandel) 
BSC: Banking Supervision Committee 
CDOs: collateralized debt obligations 
CDS: Credit Default Swap 
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CEBS: The Committee of European Banking Supervisor 
CEIOPS: Committee ofEuropean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CESR: The Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CMBS: commercial mortgage-backed securities 
CRD: The Capital Requirements Directive 
DGS: deposit guarantee schemes 
ECB: The European Central Bank 
EMI: The European Monetary Institute 
EMU: The European Economic and Monetary Union 
ESCB: The European System of Central Banks 
ESRC: The European Systemic Risk Council 
EU: European Union 
FinDAG: The Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision 
(Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz) 
FMStG: Financial Market Stability Law (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesets) 
GSEs: government-sponsored enterprises 
HRE: Hypo Real Estate 
ICAAP: The International Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
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IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IRB: internal risk -based 
ISD: The.Inves1ment Services Directive 
KWG: The German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) 
LOLR: lender oflast resort 
MiFIDs: The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MOUs: Memoranda of Understanding 
NCBs: The national central banks 
OTC: over-the-counter 
RMBS: residential mortgage-backed securities 
SREP: Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
SRP: The supervisory review process 
UCITS: The Undertakings for Collective Inves1ment in Transferable Securities 
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